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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL, 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11546 
This is an appeal by a Utah attorney from an order by 
the Utah State Bar Commission recommending disbarment. 
DISPOSITION BY COMMISSION 
After a hearing before a three man Disciplinary Committee 
which made Findings of Fact and a Conclusion of Law to the 
effect that the attorney had violated the rules of the Utah State 
Bar governing professional conduct, the Utah State Bar Com-
mission reviewed same and entered an Order recommending 
disbarment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLEE 
The appellee seeks affirmation of the Bar Commission's 
recommendation and an Order disbarring the appellant. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Following is a panoramic view of the facts to give the Court 
a general picture of the problem. As the specific Findings of 
Fact of the Disciplinary Committee are discussed, the essential 
facts will be treated in greater detail. 
In 1957, the complainant, Eugene Wagner, acting for him-
self and Precisa Calculating Machine Company, a distributor of 
adding machines and orthopedic knees, engaged Bridwell to 
represent them in connection with charges brought by the 
Internal Revenue Service ( R. 32). The company operated an 
office in Salt Lake City ( R. 31). It was a small corporation 
whose principal stockholders were an orthopedic appliance fac-
tory in Basel, Switzerland, its president and Wagner ( R. 34). 
Wagner, a Swiss national converted to the Mormon faith, has 
been doing business in Salt Lake City in connection with Swiss 
and American companies since 1948 ( R. 28-32). 
Shortly after Wagner and Precisa received deficiency notices 
from the Internal Revenue Service, Wagner returned to Switzer-
land to check the books of his company there ( R. 32-3). On 
advice of Bridwell, who was apprehensive of fraud implications 
in the Internal Revenue Service charges, Wagner remained in 
Switzerland for the next four years ( Exs. 1, 2, 5, 10, 16 and M). 
Bridwell took over the management of the company in Salt 
Lake and soon became the sole custodian of its bank account. 
The Internal Revenue Service proceeded with its project. 
Bridwell negotiated and the cases were all ultimately settled 
by May 29, 1961, except Wagner's personal case involving his 
1957 taxes, which was settled October 9, 1961 ( R. 436). 
Initially Bridwell agreed to handle the cases through the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
administrative process for the sum of $14,000 (Ex. 1). Between 
the fall of 1957, however, and September of 1958, he paid him-
self out of the Precisa bank account which he controlled, the 
sum of $19,42.5.00, taking the extra $5,425.00 without knowledge 
or pern1ission of Wagner or Precisa (Ex. F; R. 429, 70). 
In October, 1958, Bridwell withdrew from Precisa funds 
another $4,000.00 without the knowledge or permission of his 
clients, ostensibly to finance a trip for himself and his accountant, 
Frank Nielson, to Basel, Switzerland, to consult with Wagner 
and examine books and records there ( R. 352; Ex. C). 
Bridwell and Nielson worked in Basel for approximately 
three weeks. By this time the company was not operating and 
.'l 
had no income. No financial statement was submitted to 
Wagner (Ex. 6). He was not told how much remained in the 
dwindling bank account. Bridwell asked for additional fees over 
the $14,000.00 and was authorized to withdraw an additional 
$3,000.00 to give him a total of $17,000.00 ( R.70). He did not 
reveal that he had already withdrawn $23,425.00. 
By May, 1959 or earlier, the bank account was entirely 
depleted (Ex. 5). 
Precisa was buying a building in Salt Lake on contract. 
When the cash was gone, the contract payments lapsed and 
the mortgagee foreclosed ( R. 364; Ex. 19B, 5). Bridwell per-
suaded the mortgagee to give Precisa an option to repurchase 
at the same contract price. Then he arranged the sale of the 
option to his close friend and client, Robert Schubach, who 
purchased the property in 1959 ( Exs. 16, 17, 5, 19B). 
In May, 1961, he informed Wagner for the first time of the 
disposition of the property which had been accomplished two 
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years before (Ex. 5). Wagner was furious (Ex. 6). He thought 
the payments were still being made. In October, 1961, after 
settlement of all the tax cases had been achieved, Bridwell urged 
Wagner to borrow money in Switzerland so that he could buy 
the property back from Bridwell at a cost of $45,000.00 (Ex. 16). 
Schubach had bought it for $22,277.10. On October 29, 1961, 
when Bridwell informed 'Vaguer it was safe to return to Salt 
Lake because the tax cases had been settled (Ex. 17), Wagner 
did so and had to pay Schubach $35,000.00 to repurchase the 
building instead of $22,277.10, the price at which he could have 
purchased it under the option agreement (Ex. 47). Schubach 
had put some money into the property, but still made a profit 
of $10,537.82 (R. 397). 
Meantime the assets of Precisa had been sold by the Internal 
Revenue Service to satisfy tax deficiencies, and when the cases 
were settled, the government sent Precisa a refund check of 
$15,520.70 to Bridwell on October 9, 1961. Without the knowl-
edge or assent of Precisa or Wagner, Bridwell disbursed the 
refund as follows: $1,392.34 to pay taxes of certain Precisa 
Redwood Road property, $6,700.00 to his accountant, Frank 
Nielson, and $7,428.36 to himself as additional attorney's fees 
(Ex. 36). He did not inform Wagner or Precisa of the receipt 
of the refund until Wagner's return to Salt Lake in November, 
1961 ( R. 204, 376). Then he did not divulge its disbursement, 
hnt claimed that it was in an attorney's trust account in his 
office ( R. 204). Wagner asked that it be placed in a Precisa 
Corporation checking account requiring his and Bridwell's sig-
natures ( R. 204). When this was not done, Wagner hounded 
Bridwell for an accounting of the refund (Ex. 41 ) , but it was 
not until October 29, 1962, after Wagner had hired another 
attorney to represent him against Bridwell and threatened to 
rPport Bridwell to the Bar Association (Ex. 42) that Nielson, 
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Bridwell' s accountant, sent \,"\' agner a letter listing the threefold 
di<;tribution of the $15,520.70 (Ex. 36). 
Bridwell states that in midsummer of 1961, he became "as-
sured" that all of the tax claims would be settled ( R. 358). As 
a matter of fact, all of the cases against the corporation and 
Wagner except Wagner's 1957 taxes were settled by May 29, 
1961 ( R. 43.S) and Wagner's 1957 case was settled early in 
October, 1961 ( R. 436). Bridwell cabled Wagner three times 
demanding $2,000 to finance another trip to Basel. He finally 
threatened Wagner that if he did not send the money, Wagner 
might be exiled for life from the United States (Ex. 14). Wagner 
finally sent the money (Ex. 15) and Bridwell went to Europe 
alone in September, 1961. Wagner was furious that the corpora-
tion's cash and building were gone and he accused Bridwell 
of stealing money ( R. 362). Bridwell convinced him that in 
order to settle the tax cases, (which were already settled,) Wag-
ner and all of the officers of Precisa would have to execute 
corporate stockholder's meeting minutes which ratified the sale 
of the building to Schubach and absolved Bridwell of any wrong-
doing in connection with his representation of Wagner and 
Precisa (Ex. 19B, 21). Under pressure Wagner and his colleagues 
signed minutes prepared by Bridwell (Ex. 21). 
In the course of Bridwell's handling of things "at home," he 
committed other irregularities: (1) He bought a valuable Wag-
ner-owned chandelier which the government was going to sell 
at auction and gave it to Robert Schubach's father (R. 388-9); 
( 2) he got a bar built in his basement at the expense of Precisa 
( R. 408-9); and ( 3) he took funds collected by Dun & Brad-
street for Precisa and deposited them in his own personal bank 
account instead of the corporation account (R. 400, 380-1; Exs. 
27, 28, 28A, 29, 30, 31). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DELAY HAS NOT PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT 
AND DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL. 
~lr. Bridwell's claims regarding deprivation of speedy trial 
and laches are adequately negatived by this court's opinion and 
decision in the case of In re Steffensen, 78 P.2d 531, 8.5 Utah 
380 ( 1938). In that case an attorney collected $60.00 for a client 
and retained it, claiming as justification ( 1 ) that the client 
owed him additional fees, ( 2) that he could not locate the 
client, and ( 3) the client's delay in instituting the action through 
the bar constituted !aches and unreasonable delay. 
The attorney's own admissions eliminated the defense that 
he had not been able to contact his client. The attorney collected 
the money on November 11, 1930. The complaint by the Bar 
Association was filed in May, 1935. With regard to the issue 
of !aches and delay, the court said: 
"In so far as the defense of !aches pleaded in defen-
dant's answer is concerned, we do not find it sustained by 
the facts in the record. As soon as the collection by the 
attorney was known to the client, the latter was reasonably 
active thereafter in bringing forward his insistence upon 
a settlement from the attorney. When his own efforts failed, 
he enlisted the friendly efforts of other attorneys and the 
county attorney's office. When a man has employed and 
paid one attorney to make a collection, he does not need 
employ and pay another attorney to collect from the first 
in order to demonstrate an earnestness and sincerity in 
desiring to get possession of his own money. The matter 
was kept before Mr. Steffensen's attention, if not con-
stantly, at least with reasonable continuity from the time it 
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was known he had collected on the Pingree claim. Such 
delay as occurred, in pressing the claim, was due to or con-
tributed to by the attorney's own necessitous circumstances 
and was largely in his interest. H he lost files, or his mem-
ory has dimmed because of the delay, it would seem to be 
a misfortune against which he might have guarded by a 
reasonable appreciation of the outcome of his failure to 
account for and pay what was due to his client." 
In the case at bar the analogous fact exists that as soon as 
the client, Mr. Wagner, returned to the United States from 
Europe and discovered what he believed to be the unprofes-
sional conduct of his lawyer, he "was reasonably active there-
after in bringing forward his insistence upon a settlement from 
the attorney." In fact, he was more than "reasonably active." 
According to Mr. Bridwell's own brief: "After the building 
transaction had been completed (December 11, 1961), Wagner 
came to Bridwell's office and made accusations of embezzle-
ment. Bridwell told him to get out." (App. Br. p. 21). By letter 
of September 24, 1962 (Ex. 24) Wagner warned Bridwell that 
if he did not account for cash of the corporation in his posses-
sion, he would complain to the Bar Association. 
Consequently, under the rationale of the Steffensen case, 
Bridwell certainly had vigorous notice of the wrongdoing 
charged. He had opportunity at that time to rectify the mis-
conduct of which he was later found guilty by the Disciplinary 
Committee and the Bar Commission. He had unmistakable 
warning at that time that he could anticipate criminal, civil or 
disciplinary action, and he had ample opportunity to assemble 
and preserve any evidence which might assist him in his defense. 
On May 6, 1963, he was informed of the letter of complaint 
which had been filed against him. This is only a year and a 
half after Wagner accused him of embezzlement. That was not 
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too late for him to have assembled and preserved whatever 
evidence he could in preparation for his defense. 
Bridwell has not been prejudiced by any delay of prosecu-
tion. 
There is an abundance of authority declaring that a dis-
barment proceeding is not affected by a statute of limitations 
unless a specific statute has been enacted to cover such pro-
ceeding. 
"b. Limitations and Laches. General statutes of limi-
tations are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings, 
although staleness of a charge may prevent its being con-
sidered. Special statutes, if valid, will bar the prosecution 
of such a proceeding. 
"The general statute of limitations is no defense to a 
proceeding for the disbarment or suspension of an attor-
ney, nor will the courts establish a limitation as to the 
time in which such proceedings may be instituted by an-
alogy to the statute of limitations unless, from the nature 
or circumstances of the particular case, it appears that 
it would be unjust or unfair to require the attorney to 
answer as to such occurrences. 
"Staleness in a charge against an attorney may prevent 
its being considered, because an unreasonable delay in the 
presentation of a charge of misconduct may make it impos-
sible for an attorney to procure the witnesses or the testi-
mony which would have been available at an earlier time 
to meet such charge. However, the court will not refuse 
to hear charges of unprofessional conduct against an attor-
ney because of expiration of long period of time unless it 
would be unjust to compel him to answer such charges." 
7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, §25b, p. 766. 
"62. Limitations and Laches. Disciplinary proc.eed-
ings are not barred by the general statute of limitations. 
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Nor is a disciplinary proceeding barred because it is 
grounded on acts that also constitute a crime that cannot 
be prosecuted in a criminal action because of limitations. 
However, proceedings instituted a long time after the 
commission of the act complained of are regarded with 
disfavor." 7 Am. Jur. 2d, §62, p. 86. 
"It seems, however, that, except in the few states 
which have enacted specific statutes on the subject, there 
is no limitation on the time for instituting disbarment pro-
ceedings, except the inherent power of the court to refuse 
to hear an application to disbar which has been unreas-
onably delayed, a subject not within the scope of the 
present discussion. 
"It has been said generally in several cases that the 
ordinary statutes of limitations have no application to a 
disbarment proceeding. Re Lowenthal ( 1889) 78 Cal. 427, 
21 Pac. 7; People ex rel. Stead v. Phipps ( 1913) 261 Ill. 
576, 104 N.E. 144; Re Elliott ( 1906) 73 Kan. 151, 84 Pac. 
750; Re Leonard ( 1908) 127 App. Div. 493, 111 N.Y. Supp. 
905, affirmed in ( 1908) 193 N.Y. 655, 87 N.E. 1121; State 
ex. rel. Grievance Committee v. Woerndle ( 1923) 109 
Or. 461, 209 Pac. 604, 220 Pac. 744; Wilhelm's Case ( 1921) 
269 Pa. 416, 112 Atl. 560. 
"The statutory bar against actions at law has no appli-
cation to a proceeding for disbarment. Re Simpkins ( 1915) 
169 App. Div. 632, 155 N.Y. Supp. 521. 
" 'The same principles which authorize the court to 
entertain charges against an attorney of violating his pro-
fessional duties, irrespective of any civil or criminal pro-
ceedings against him, render the bar of the Statute of 
Limitations against a civil or criminal proceeding an im-
material element.' Ex parte Tyler ( 1895) 107 Cal. 78, 40 
Pac. 33. 
" 'The Statute of Limitations has no application to 
delinquencies such as have been shown to exist. The court 
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in such cases, will consider any unexplained, unreasonable 
delay in presenting the charges, and also whether, by 
reason of such delay, the accused has been deprived of a 
fair opportunity of securing proof to meet the accusation; 
but the proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney is not 
barred by the express terms of the Statute of Limitations, 
nor will the courts establish a limitation as to the time in 
which such proceedings may be instituted, by analogy to 
the Statute of Limitations, unless, from the nature of the 
circumstances of the particular case, it appears that it 
would be unjust or unfair to require the attorney to answer 
as to such occurrences.' People ex. rel. Healy v. Hooper 
( 1905) 218 Ill. 313, 75 N.E. 896. 
" 'It is contended that the proceeding was barred by 
some statute of limitations, but the accused points out no 
particular limitations applicable to cases of this character. 
Staleness in a charge against an attorney might prevent its 
being considered, because an unreasonable delay in the 
presentation of a charge of misconduct might make it 
impossible for an attorney to procure witnesses or the tes-
timony which would have been available at an earlier 
time to meet such charge; but the Statute of Limitations 
itself is no defense to such a proceeding.' Re Smith ( 1906) 
73 Kan. 7 43, 85 Pac. 584." Annotation, Statutory Limitation 
of time for disbarment proceeding, 45 A.L.R. 1111. 
It is clear, therefore, in this case that the defense of the 
statute of limitations is not available to Mr. Bridwell. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COM-
MITTEE ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE CORRECT. 
This court in the case of In re Macfarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 10 
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Utah 2d 217 ( 1960), defined its position with regard to the 
review of Bar Commission findings: 
" ( 3, 4) It is true that this court would not follow 
the finding and recommendation of the Commission if it 
appeared to be arbitrary, nor unless it was supported by 
substantial evidence. But it is quite impractical to expect 
that there be a review of the mental process by which the 
conclusion was arrived at. We are not concerned with the 
niceties of the term 'presumption' but with a survey of 
the foundational facts and whether reasonable minds 
might regard the overall picture as meeting the required 
standard of proof that respondent engaged in unprofes-
sional conduct. 
0 
" ( 5, 6) On this problem it is relevant to observe that 
the propriety of the questioned conduct must necessarily 
be directed to the good conscience and ethical and moral 
standards of members of the Bar, and that the Bar Com-
missioners as its elected representatives are peculiarly 
suited to be the arbiters of such standards. They are 
vitally concerned with the general conduct of the Bar 
and its public relations and are also seriously concerned 
with a charge against a fellow member such as that in-
volved in the instant proceeding. 
"It is basic that the responsibility is upon the Bar and 
the courts to supervise those licensed to practice and to 
disbar, suspend or discipline those guilty of infractions of 
proper standards because the practice of law is not a right 
accorded all citizens, but is a privilege extended only upon 
showing good character, meeting required qualifications 
and maintaining proper professional standards. In the 
prudent e~ercise of the power to discipline in order to 
maintain such standards lies the protection of the public 
and of the Bar itself. 
" ( 7) We accept the fact that the final responsibility 
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is upon this court and that this involves more than mere 
rubber stamp endorsement of the actions of the Commis-
sion. Nevertheless, because of the considerations just dis-
cussed, we deem it discreet and proper to indulge 
considerable latitude to the actions and judgment of the 
Commission in such matters and would not disregard its 
finding and recommendation in the absence of some per-
suasive reason for doing so." 
The writer submits that the Findings of Fact made by 
the Disciplinary Committee and affirmed by the Bar Commis-
sion are supported by substantial evidence. There is no "per-
suasive reason" to disregard the Commission's Findings. Based 
on the standard set by the Macfarlane case, the Findings and 
Conclusions should be sustained. 
A. Threats and Coercion 
The Commission's first Finding was: 
"a. That the attorney in the cablegrams and letters 
offered in evidence, used threats and coercion without 
explanation to extract an additional $2,000.00 fee; that no 
emergency circumstances existed justifying the coercion 
exercised (See exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15)." 
The Finding is supported by Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 
15. Exhibit 10 is a cablegram from Bridwell to Wagner, dated 
August 3, 1961, in which Bridwell states: 
"Received your letter of July 26 and contents noted 
under no circumstances are you to return now new devel-
opments make mandatory you send two thousand dollars 
to me at once personal conference urgent and imperative 
further letters useless your continued total confidence 
necessary or I must withdraw." 
Bridwell does not hint at what the new developments are 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
and indicates he will withdraw as counsel unless the money 
is sent. 
Exhibit 11 is a letter elated August 3, 1961, from Wagner 
in Switzerland to Bridwell in Salt Lake City in response to the 
cablegram. Wagner refuses to send the $2,000 but asks Bridwell 
to come to Basel for a Conference. He requests that Bridwell 
send him annual reports of the corporation for 19.58-.59-60 and a 
copy of the final settlement with the government on the tax 
case. It is remarkable that Bridwell would ask for another 
$2,000 after he had completely depleted the corporation's bank 
account and yet not given his client an annual financial report 
for three years. 
Exhibit 12 is another cablegram, dated August 8, 1961, 
from Bridwell to Wagner reading: 
"August 3rd letter received and noted imperative for 
many important reasons you send 2000 dollars at once you 
will fully agree when I see you." 
In the five days between the first and second cablegrams, 
Bridwell had not seen fit to write Wagner a letter and describe 
any of the "many important reasons" why Wagner should send 
$2,000 "at once". 
Exhibit 13 is an undated letter from Wagner to Bridwell 
in response to the second cablegram stating that he can't send 
$2,000 because he does not have it. He advises he would borrow 
the money from the bank if Bridwell would send him "detailed 
information what the money is intended for," so that he could 
explain the need for the loan to the bank. He writes: "The Utah 
corporation must have assets" and suggests Bridwell take $2,000 
from the corporation account and charge it to him. Though 
the corporation account had been depleted approximately two 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
years before, Bridwell still has not informed him that the cor-
poration is without funds. Again Wagner requests the annual 
reports. 
Exhibit 14 is an insulting, intemperate, threatening cable-
gram, sent by Bridwell to his client: 
"Letter of August eighth received and noted you don't 
seem to understand English language no more argument 
or excuses or you may loose [sic] five years of work and 
gain a life of exile do exactly repeat exactly as stated or 
forget it and I will then later be at liberty to write you full 
details on why your house of cards fell." 
Never did Bridwell in his testimony delineate what the 
emergency was that required him to demand $2,000 from his 
client without explanation for its need. 
The committee's Finding of Fact is abundantly supported 
by the exhibits. 
B. Failure to Account for Sums Received 
1. Dun and Bradstreet Collectwns. 
Wagner delivered to Bridwell certain accounts receivable 
of the Precisa Calculating Company to be collected. Bridwell 
turned them over to Dun and Bradstreet for handling. Bridwell 
testilied that: 
"I recall Dun and Bradstreet was collecting the ac-
counts. That is all I can recall about it. I do recall that 
upon occasion I would get money in the office, checks. I 
assume they are from collections .... I would take them 
down to the factory, down to the plant, and give them to 
whoever was there, or if I didn't happen to be dropping 
by there, I would mail them to Farmers State Bank." (R. 
379-80). 
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Bridwell was shown Exhibit 28, a check from Dun and 
Bradstreet to Precisa Calculating Machine Company for $225.50, 
Exhibit 29 for $79.00 and Exhibit 30 for $78.44. All three had 
been endorsed by Bridwell and deposited in his account at 
Valley State Bank (R. 216-7; Ex. 44). Bridwell conceded the 
endorsement signatures were his ( R. 380) and the checks them-
selves reveal that they were deposited in the Valley State Bank 
in 1958 and 1959. Precisa had not had an account in that bank 
since 1952. Bridwell admitted that he did have an account in 
that bank at the time the checks were deposited ( R. 400). He 
had no recollection of the checks or of making the deposits 
and supplied no evidence of ever having accounted for that 
money to Precisa or Wagner ( R. 380-1). 
Rule II, Section 23, of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar provides as follows: 
"Section 23. An attorney and counselor rece1vmg 
money or property of his client in the course of his pro-
fessional business, shall pay or deliver the same to the 
person entitled thereto within a reasonable time, unless he 
has just cause for retaining it." 
Rule III, Section 32.11, provides: 
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby 
for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or talces advan-
tage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. 
"Money of the client or collected for the client or other 
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer 
should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should 
not under any circumstances be comingled with his own 
or be used by him." 
Certainly the handling of the above described checks con-
stituted a violation of those rules. 
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2. Failure to Account for the Use of the $4,000. 
The second paragraph of the second Finding of Fact reads 
in part as follows : 
"That the attorney with authority to incur the expenses 
of a trip to Switzerland, took $4,000.00 of the repayment 
made by Metropolitan Finance Company and used this 
money for that trip, and thereafter never made any ac-
counting to his client itemizing the expenditure of the 
$4,000.00." 
In the fall of 1958 Bridwell and his accountant, Nielson, 
went to Basel, Switzerland, to confer with Wagner ( R. 350-1 ) . 
Prior to taking the trip, he did not have any communication 
with Wagner concerning expenses for the trip ( R. 351). Some-
time after Wagner went to Europe in 1958 and left Bridwell 
in charge of Precisa's bank account, Bridwell withdrew $10,000 
from the account and loaned it to Metropolitan Finance 
Company ( R. 399; Ex. 26), a company operated by his friend 
and client, Robert M. Schubach, who was the company's man-
aging partner. Bridwell' s mother was a partner ( R. 128). 
Bridwell testified that it was from Metropolitan Finance 
Company that he acquired $4,000 and applied it on the expense 
of the 1958 trip ( R. 351, 399). 
There is no evidence that any accounting of the expenditure 
of the $4,000 was made to Wagner or Precisa except that it 
was charged to travel expense in an accounting Nielson sent 
to Wagner in 1958 ( R. 302). There is no evidence that any 
breakdown of the travel expense was ever given to Wagner or 
Precisa. Nielson testified that $2,500 was used for airline tickets 
and the remaining $1,500 was converted into travelers' checks 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
and taken by Bridwell. Nielso~ simply listed it as t~avel expense 
and could not testify beyond that ( R. 302). 
This evidence also clearly demonstrates a violation of Rule 
III, Section 32.11. 
3. Failure to Account Properly for the $15,520 Government 
Refund. 
The third Finding of Paragraph b of the Committee's Find-
ings of Fact reads as follows: 
"That near October 9, 1961, the Federal government 
refunded to the attorney $15,520.00 for his client; that the 
client made repeated requests of the attorney for an ac-
counting showing the disbursement of said funds, but that 
the attorney never made any accounting to the client. 
That the attorney advised the client that the funds received 
on the government refund were deposited in a trust ac-
count for the benefit of Precisa and Wagner which state-
ment was untrue. That after repeated requests by the 
client for an accounting one was provided by Accountant 
Nielson on October 29, 1962, as reflected in exhibit 36, 
indicating the monies had previously been disbursed prin-
cipally to the attorney and Accountant Nielson." 
Sometime between October 9, 1961, (R. 436) and October 
14, 1961, Bridwell received a refund check from the Internal 
Revenue Service in the amount of $15,220.70 for Precisa (R. 
374; Ex. 36). The above dates may be deduced from Bridwell's 
testimony ( R. 375 ) : 
"I sent a letter to Mr. Joe Thomas of the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue on October 14, 1961, telling him fd paid 
the taxes on the Redwood Road property and I enclosed 
some copies of the Salt Lake County Treasurer's receipts 
9381 and 9382, evidencing payment." 
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Bridwell's testimony is that he did not inform Wagner of 
the receipt of the refund until Wagner returned to Salt Lake 
City in November, 1961 ( R. 376). Without notifying Wagner 
of the receipt of the refund and without consulting him con-
cerning its disbursement, he used $1,392.34 to pay real property 
taxes on the Redwood Road property owned by Precisa ( R. 
375), paid Nielson, the accountant, $6,700 and paid himself 
$7,428.36 (Ex. 36). Bridwell paid himself the $7,428.36 in spite 
of the fact that Wagner had specifically instructed him in 
Switzerland in September that he was not to take any in attor-
ney's fees, but that he could pay Nielson $6,000 for accounting 
fees ( R. 106); however, that the $6,000 was not to come out of 
the refund. 
Inasmuch as the Internal Revenue Service mailed the 
refund check on September 9, 1961 ( R. 436), it should have 
reached Bridwell at least by the 11th or 12th of the month. 
He had the $15,520 in his hands on or before the 14th, because 
by the 14th he had used part of it to pay the taxes on the Red-
wood property, and on the 14th wrote the Internal Revenue 
Service to that effect. 
Though he could write the Internal Revenue Service, he 
did not choose to write his client at this time and tell him of 
the refund, the satisfaction of the taxes, and that it was now 
safe for him to come back to the states. Instead, on October 
12, 1961, he wrote his client a remarkable letter (Ex. 16). It 
said nothing about the receipt and disbursement of the $15,000. 
Instead, he said: "I have no way of knowing when I would 
recommend that you return to the United States." However, 
he believed the tax matter would be settled shortly and that 
Wagner could return no later than the middle of November. 
He mentioned the taxes on the Redwood Road property, but 
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did not reveal that they were paid. He told Wagner that he 
had informed the Internal Revenue Service he would lend 
Precisa the money to pay the Redwood ,Road taxes, when in 
fact he had either already paid the taxes or did pay them within 
the next two days out of the refund received from the Internal 
Revenue Service. In that letter he did not inform Wagner that 
he had received the refund, if in fact he had, by October 12th. 
Rather, he urged Wagner to consult his contacts in Switzerland 
and "immediately borrow from them the sum of $25,000" to 
buy the building back from his friend and client, Schubach, at 
the price of $45,000 - a price at which Schubach would have 
made a profit in excess of $20,000. Bridwell's brief admits 
Schubach made a profit of $10,000 at the subsequently nego-
tiated price of $35,000. Actually the profit was $10,537.82 ( R. 
397 ) . Bridwell' s letter is vigorous in Schubach' s behalf, urging 
the transaction on Wagner. He told Wagner that Schubach 
could sell it for $50,000 - "which he is very desirous of doing 
and doing rapidly." However, if Wagner "will respond at once 
by return mail'', Bridwell could, in effect, get his property back 
for him wholesale - $45,000. According to Bridwell's letter, 
Wagner should "immediately borrow." He urged: "Please let 
me hear at once .... I suggest that you immediately start check-
ing into the financial arrangements on this and if you are in-
terested, let's complete the entire transaction before you come 
back." (Emphasis supplied by Bridwell). If we assume the 
letter from the Internal Revenue Service was late, giving Brid-
well the benefit of any doubt, and assuming that he received 
the $15,520 on the 12th, 13th or 14th after he wrote this letter, 
he did not promptly after the receipt of the money inform 
Wagner of that fact. He kept the information secret, allowing 
Wagner, if he had been so disposed, to contact his friends, 
borrow $25,000 and send it to Bridwell before "he came back'" 
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and before he knew of the refund and the manner of its dis-
bursement. 
However, if Bridwell's own testimony is accurate, he had 
received the refund prior to sending his October 12, 1961 letter 
( Ex. 16). He testified as follows: 
"They ( I.RS.) were going to attach this property 
(Redwood Road) and sell it to them for that. Taxes had 
not been paid on it by Mr. Wagner for some time. I told 
the people of the I.RS. - I had received the refund check 
by this time - that I was going to loan Mr. Wagner enough 
money to pay those taxes and in turn they agreed with 
me that they would give a reasonable time in that event 
for Mr. Wagner to make payments." (Emphasis supplied) 
(R 374-5). 
Then on October 12, Bridwell, who had already received 
the $15,520, wrote Wagner that he had told the Internal Revenue 
Service he was going to lend him (Wagner) the money to pay 
the taxes; then Bridwell paid the taxes out of the refund, and 
on October 14, informed the Internal Revenue Service that the 
taxes had been paid, sending them the receipts. In other words, 
Bridwell took the position in his own mind that the $15,520 
belonged to him. Out of it he paid his accountant $6,700 and 
'1oaned" Wagner or Precisa $1,392.34 to pay the taxes on the 
Redwood property. But he. did not explain this to Wagner. He 
secluded from Wagner the receipt of the refund until November, 
1961, and then secreted its disbursement until his accountant's 
letter of October 29, 1962 (Ex. 36). It is clear that from the 
moment of his receipt of the $15,520 he intended to treat it as 
his own money, pay Nielson what he owed him out of it and 
retain the remainder except the $1,392.34 which he loaned to 
Wagner to pay the taxes on the Redwood property. 
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Two weeks went by during which time Wagner offered to 
pay Schubach $38,000. Then on October 27, 1961, Bridwell 
wrote his next remarkable letter (Ex. 17) to Wagner, telling 
him he could come home and liquidate the Redwood Road 
property to pay the $17,364.21 he still owed the Inte~al Revenue 
Service. Bridwell had by this time divided approximately 
$14,000 of the $15,520 between Nielson and himself and he 
still did not in the letter of October 27 tell Wagner about it. 
Then on behalf of his client Schubach, he urged his client 
Wagner to pay $42,000 to repurchase the building. He said: 
". . . Would suggest to you that you make immediate 
arrangements with the Handwerker Bank to forthwith 
send the $42,000 so that these matters may be resolved at 
once and we can all go forward and upward." 
Bridwell obviously wanted the sale concluded, the papers 
signed and the money in Schubach's hands before Wagner 
could get back to Salt Lake City. 
But Wagner returned and eventually, in December of 1961, 
handled the negotiations himself with Schubach and got the 
property back for $35,000 and Schubach made only a $10,500 
profit. 
In November Wagner asked Bridwell where the refund 
money was and Bridwell told him it was in his attorney's trust 
account in his office ( R. 204). Wagner told him that he wanted 
the money put in a checking account in the Farmers State Banlc 
in the name of the corporation, requiring two signatures, his 
and Bridwell's (R. 204). Bridwell ignored the instruction .. On 
December 25, 1961, Wagner wrote Bridwell stating: 
"I want to see that money to be put in a checking 
account in the name of the corporation with two signa-
tures necessary to draw; namely, you and I." (Ex. 41) 
Bridwell ignored the letter. 
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For the next nine months, Wagner tried in vain to induce 
Bridwell to make an accounting. On August 30, 1962, he de-
manded Bridwell surrender the cash and he consulted Attorney 
Max Mangum of Salt Lake, seeking his assistance to obtain an 
accounting. Mangum contacted Bridwell. Bridwell stated he 
did not want to meet Wagner and had his secretary deliver to 
Mangum' s office a minute book, a folder of correspondence 
and an envelope containing a few "statistic sheets". No cash 
was delivered and the refund amount was still unaccounted for. 
Wagner described the above in his letter dated September 24, 
1962 (Ex. 42) in which he charged Bridwell with embezzlement 
and threatened to call on the Bar Association for help. 
Finally, by letter from the accountant Nielson to Wagner, 
dated October 29, 1962 (Ex. 36) Wagner finally learned what 
had happened to the $15,520, more than a year after Bridwell 
had received it. It was then that the frustrated Wagner made 
his complaint to the Bar Association. 
Bridwell' s conduct in connection with the refund violates 
Rule III, Section 32.12 of the Rules of Practice, and the evidence 
clearly supports the Committee's Finding of Fact. 
C. Chandelier Incident. 
Paragraph c of the Committee's Findings is as follows: 
"The attorney's request to a government auctioneer 
to withh~ld a chandelier from the sale and the attorney's 
purchase of the chandelier on the following day when no 
other competitive bidders were expected to be present 
was a representation of conflicting interests." 
The chandelier had considerable sentimental and some 
economic value to Wagner. Bridwell in his testimony simply 
admits that he paid $150 for the chandelier and gave it to a 
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friend ( R. 388-9), and he has made no effort to get it back for 
\Vagner. 
Based on Bridwell's own admission, the conflict of interest 
between himself and his client is obvious and the Committee's 
Finding is supported by the evidence. 
D. Conflict Involving Sale and Repurchase of Building. 
Paragraph e of the Committee's Findings reads as follows: 
"e. As amended to relate to conflict of interest. That 
the attorney did in fact represent both Schubach and 
Wagner and Precisa companies, and there is evidence 
that he related to Wagner and Precisa Company that he 
had taken steps to protect the building so that they could 
regain possession. That the attorney in exercising the 
option on behalf of Precisa and in signing that interest to 
Schubach who subsequently made a $10,000.00 profit on 
the transaction was contrary to the best interest of his 
client, Wagner and Precisa. That the interests of Schubach 
and Precisa and Wagner were hostile to each other, and 
the attorney's representation of both parties constituted a 
breach of his duty to his client and a representation of con-
flicting interests." 
Precisa owned an equity in a building at 375 West 4th 
South, Salt Lake City. It was the place of business of the com-
pany in Utah. A mortgage was held by N. R. and Johanna Hines. 
Precisa was purchasing under contract (Ex. 19B). When Brid-
well by 1959 had withdrawn all of the money out of Precisa's 
bank account to pay his own fees and expenses, there were no 
funds left to make payments on the contract. Hines foreclosed. 
Bridwell acquired an option for repurchase by Precisa. Then 
without the knowledge or consent of Precisa or Wagner, he 
sold the option to his friend and client, Schubach (Ex. 19A & B). 
Facts concerning this transaction were not communicated to 
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Wagner or Precisa until Bridwell's letter to Wagner in May, 
1961. Then by the letters of October 12 and 27, 1961 ( Exs. 16 
and 17) Bridwell urged vVagner to pay a premium to repurchase 
the building. I have already discussed those letters and their 
significance at length in a previous section of this brief. 
Rule III, Section 32.6, second paragraph, of Revised Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, provides as 
follows: 
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, 
except by express consent of all concerned given after a 
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this 
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in 
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that 
which duty to another client requires him to oppose." 
It is clear that Bridwell was in violation of the conflict 
provision, and substantial evidence supports the Committee's 
Finding in that regard. 
E. Unauthorized Withdrawal of Funds for Attorney's Fees. 
The first paragraph of Section g of the Findings of Fact 
reads as follows: 
"g. That the attorney's withdrawal of sums of money 
(except the original $14,000.00) from the client's corporate 
assets for additional legal fees was without the authoriza-
tion or knowledge of the client. That there was some 
discussion between the attorney and the client that there 
may be additional sums to be paid on the attorney's fees, 
but there was no authorization nor knowledge as to with-
drawal or use of funds under the attorney's control as 
attorney's fees exceeding the $14,000.00 original figure. 
That the records indicate that $19,425.00 and $4,000.00 
had already been taken by the attorney before the first 
trip to Switzerland when the necessity for additional attor-
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ney's fees were verbally discussed. Among the evidence 
which sustains this see exhibits C, E, F, and 46." 
Bridwell's Exhibit F details the withdrawals made which 
constituted payments to himself. It reveals that Bridwell had 
paid himself $19,425 prior to his second visit to Switzerland in 
September, 1961 (Ex. F; R. 429). Exhibit C and Bridwell's tes-
timony disclosed that he had taken an additional $4,000 osten-
sibly to pay expenses for him and Nielson to go to Europe (R. 
352; Ex. C). 
The testimony of Wagner is that up to the time of the 
European trip only $17,000 in withdrawals had been authorized 
(R. 70). 
Bridwell's admissions under examination by Mr. Van Wag-
enen, member of the Committee, confirms his withdrawals of 
fees without authorization. 
"MR. VAN WAGENEN: Yes. In going over Exhibit 
F, which was a calculation prepared by, I believe, Mr. 
Nielson indicating the Precisa checks to you, Mr. Bridwell, 
if my calculations are correct, as of the date that you went 
on this trip you had already drawn $19,425.00, not includ-
ing the $4,000.00 check for the travel expenses. 
"THE WITNESS: The four thousand is for travel. 
"MR. VAN WAGENEN: Yes, but up to that point 
you had already drawn from the company $19,425.00. 
"THE WITNESS: Whatever the exhibits reflect. 
"MR. VAN W AGENEN: Can you explain any author-
ity for doing that? 
''THE WITNESS: I just didn't assume there'd be any 
problem because of the increased workload. Nobody Io:1ew 
what was going on when it first happened and I - possibly 
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it could have been - I don't have any documentation. 
Again, I've looked an<l looked. Maybe that was discussed 
over the phone. I don't say that it was but it could have 
been. I just don't know. 
"MR. VAN W AGENEN: But you don't recall any 
specific authorization? 
"THE WITNESS: No sir." (R. 407-8). 
In Section 3 of this brief I have already discussed the 
unauthorized acquisition of an additional $7,428.36 fee accom-
plished by Bridwell in October, 1961. 
The Committee's Finding on this subject is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
F. The Exoneration Minutes. 
The second paragraph of Section g of the Findings of Fact 
reads as follows: 
"That the action of the attorney in preparing and 
securing the adoption of minutes of the stockholders meet-
ing in Switzerland were for the protection of the attorney 
in an effort to exonerate himself from any wrongdoing or 
excuse any previous conduct for which he felt he might 
ultimately have some responsibility to his client." 
Concerning Bridwell's reasons for taking the September, 
1961 trip to Switzerland, he testified that there were two main 
reasons. The first was, he said, to prove that the building was 
lost to the corporation and that the sale to Schubach was bona 
fide. The second was to get the affidavit (Ex. E) signed. With 
respect to the first reason, he testified: 
"Q. All right. Now, getting down to the precise 
reason that you felt that it was necessary for you to go to 
Switzerland in August of 1961, will you tell us about that? 
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"A. Well, in my varied conferences with these people 
they didn't believe that the building was lost to the cor-
poration. They didn't think it was a bona fide transaction 
with Schubach for one thing." ( R. 357) 
Bridwell is not being candid in that testimony because all 
of the tax cases against the corporation had been settled by 
May 29, 1961 (R. 435). All cases against Wagner personally had 
been settled by that date except a case involving his 1957 taxes 
( R. 4.35-6). Consequently, by May 29, 1961, the Internal Revenue 
Service had allowed the loss of the building as claimed. There 
was no need to go to Europe to get minutes or a power of 
attorney or an affidavit to support that claim. 
With respect to the affidavit he testified: 
"The reason I felt it necessary to go was - and also 
by the time I went I was pretty much assured I was going 
to be able to work out these 1957 tax problems and I 
wanted to make certain, for one thing, that - to have the 
backing of an executed Exhibit E which I didn't have." 
(R. 358) 
Exhibit E, the affidavit which he wanted the Precisa per-
sonnel to sign, had nothing to do with the power of attorney 
and the self-serving minutes he drafted and got executed. He 
never did get the affidavit signed, but he devoted a substantial 
part of his time to getting the whitewashing minutes executed. 
He coerced Wagner into signing them and into inducing his 
colleagues to sign them by threatening Wagner "with perma-
nent exile" from the United States (Ex. 221, Ex. 14). He did 
this, knowing as he stated in his testimony ( R. 358) that: 
"By the time I went I was pretty much assured I was 
going to be able to work out these 1957 tax problems." 
Those were the only problems left to be resolved. Yet 
knowing that, he scared Wagner into approving and getting 
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his fellow stockholders to approve his self-serving minutes. 
"Being pretty much assured" he was "going to be able to work 
out these 1957 tax problems", he cabled Wagner in August, 
1961: 
"Letter of August eighth received and noted you 
don't seem to understand English language no more argu-
ment or excuses or you may loose [sic] five years of work 
and gain a life of exile do exactly repeat exactly as stated 
or forget it and I will then later be at liberty to write you 
full details on why your house of cards fell." (Ex. 14). 
Now we know why it was "imperative for many important 
reasons you send $2,000 at once" (Ex. 12). Bridwell had the 
corporation's tax cases wrapped up but he wanted the exonerat-
ing minutes executed and the sale to his client friend, Schubach, 
ratified before Wagner returned to Salt Lake. 
Substantial evidence supports the Finding of the Com-
mittee that the minutes were for the "protection of the attorney 
in an effort to exonerate himself." 
G. Improvement of the Attorney's Home. 
Finding h of the Committee reads as follows: 
"h. That the attorney accepted labor and materials 
for the improvement of the attorney's home from a con-
tractor tenant of the client's corporation and then credited 
the tenant with the value of said labor and materials on 
the tenant's rent, which rent should have been paid to 
the client's corporation." 
Bridwell by his own testimony admits the guilt of this 
charge ( R. 408-9). 
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CONCLUSION 
The three lawyers on the Disciplinary Committee who acted 
as judges are recognized as experienced and capable trial coun-
sel. They have had many years of experience in judging the 
credibility of witnesses and weighing and evaluating evidence. 
They were there and saw and heard Wagner and Bridwell 
testify. They are in the best position to assess the veracity of 
the testimony. They were able to observe, as this brief has 
pointed out, that Bridwell in most instances condemned himself 
with his own testimony and his own exhibits. They were 
patient and liberal in their rulings on evidence, giving Bridwell 
a full and fair hearing. There is substantial evidence to support 
their findings. 
The members of the Bar Commission reviewed the record, 
confirmed the Committee's Findings and Conclusions, and en-
tered an Order recommending disbarment. Then the Commission 
at the request of Bridwell reopened and reconsidered, permitted 
reargument and renewed their order recommending disbarment. 
The recommendation of the Commission should be imple-
mented by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
336 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Prosecuting 
Committee 
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